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Abstract:      
Good  corporate  governance  is  an  important  step  in  building  market 
confidence and encouraging more stable, long-term international investment 
flows. Many countries see better corporate governance practices as a way to 
improve  economic  dynamism  and  thus  enhance  overall  economic 
performance.  This  paper  sets  out  to  further  develop  our  understanding  of 
corporate  governance  and  its  effects  on  corporate  performance  and 
economic  performance.  In  doing  so,  it  addresses  some  of  the  underlying 
factors that promote efficient corporate governance, and examines some of 
the  economic  implications  associated  with  various  corporate  governance 
systems.  I  provide  an  framework  for  understanding  how  corporate 
governance  can  affect  corporate  performance.  In  the  wake  of  a  literature 
survey, I find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, 
insider  ownership  matters  the  most,  outside  ownership  concentration 
destroys market value, direct ownership being superior to indirect. 
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Introduction 
The  compatibility  of  corporate 
governance  practices  with  global 
standards  has  also  become  an 
important  part  of  corporate  success. 
The  practice  of  good  corporate 
governance  has  therefore  become  a 
necessary  prerequisite  for  any 
corporation to manage effectively in the 
globalized market. 
The  term  “corporate  governance” 
is a relatively new one both in the public 
and  academic  debates,  although  the 
issues  it  addresses  have  been  around 
for  much  longer,  at  least  since  Berle 
and Means (1932) and the even earlier 
Smith  (1776).In  the  last  two  decades, 
however,  corporate  governance  issues 
have become important not only in the 
academic  literature,  but  also  in  public 
policy  debates.  During  this  period, 
corporate  governance  has  been 
identified  with  takeovers,  financial 
restructuring, and institutional investors' 
activism.  One  can  talk  about  the 
governance of a transaction, of a club, 
and,  in  general,  of  any  economic 
organization.  In  a  narrow  sense, 
corporate  governance  is  simply  the 
governance  of  a  particular 
organizational form - a corporation. 
Viewing the corporation as a nexus 
of explicit and implicit contracts, Garvey 
and  Swan  assert  that  governance 
determines how the firm’s top decision 
makers  actually  administer  such 
contracts [7].  
Shleifer  and  Vishny  define 
corporate governance by stating that it 
deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of  finance  to  corporations  assure 
themselves of getting a return on their 
investment  [21].  A  similar  concept  is 
suggested by Caramanolis-Cötelli, who 
regards corporate governance as being 
determined  by  the  equity  allocation 
among  insiders  and  outside  investors  
[4]. 
John  and  Senbet  propose  the 
more  comprehensive  definition  that  
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corporate  governance  deals  with 
mechanisms by which stakeholders of a 
corporation  exercise  control  over 
corporate  insiders  and  management 
such  that  their  interests  are  protected 
[13].  They  include  as  stakeholders  not 
just shareholders, but also debtholders 
and  even  non-financial  stakeholders 
such  as  employees,  suppliers, 
customers, and other interested parties. 
Hart  closely  shares  this  view  as  he 
suggests  that  corporate  governance 
issues  arise  in  an  organization 
whenever  two  conditions  are  present 
[10]. First, there is an agency problem, 
or conflict of interest, involving members 
of  the  organization  –  these  might  be 
owners,  managers,  workers  or 
consumers.  Second,  transaction  costs 
are  such  that  this  agency  problem 
cannot be dealt with through a contract. 
Zingales  defines  corporate 
governance  as  the  complex  set  of 
constraints  that  shape  the  ex-post 
bargaining  over  the  quasi-rents 
generated by a firm [24]. He considers 
that  all  the  governance  mechanisms 
discussed  in  the  literature  can  be 
reinterpreted in light of this definition.  
An  OECD  study  considers  that 
corporate governance is the system by 
which  business  corporations  are 
directed  and  controlled  [19].  The 
corporate  governance  structure 
specifies  the  distribution  of  rights  and 
responsibilities  among  different 
participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and 
other  stakeholders,  and  spells  out  the 
rules  and  procedures  for  making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this,  it  also  provides  the  structure 
through  which  the  company  objectives 
are  set,  and  the  means  of  attaining 
those  objectives  and  monitoring 
performance. 
Roe  define  corporate  governance 
as the relationships at the top of the firm 
-  the  board  of  directors,  the  senior 
managers, and the stockholders  [20]. In 
his  opinion  institutions  of  corporate 
governance  are  those  repeated 
mechanisms  that  allocate  authority 
among  the  three  and  that  affect, 
modulate  and  control  the  decisions 
made at the top of the firm. 
Core  corporate  governance 
institutions  respond  to  two  distinct 
problems,  one  of  vertical  governance 
(between  distant  shareholders  and 
managers)  and  another  of  horizontal 
governance  (between  a  close, 
controlling  shareholder  and  distant 
shareholders). 
A  few  studies  have  examined 
corporate  governance  in  emerging 
markets.  Researchers  [5,14,15]  have 
studied  the  implications  of  the 
concentrated  corporate  ownership  that 
is  common  in  many  emerging  and 
developed  markets  and  conclude  that 
the  principal  agency  problem  in  large 
corporations around the world is that of 
restricting  expropriation  of  minority 
shareholders  by  the  controlling 
shareholders. 
 
Principles for corporate 
governance 
Corporate governance is only part 
of the larger economic context in which 
firms  operate,  which  includes,  for 
example,  macroeconomic  policies  and 
the  degree  of  competition  in  product 
and  factor  markets.  The  corporate 
governance framework also depends on 
the  legal,  regulatory,  and  institutional 
environment.  In  addition,  factors  such 
as  business  ethics  and  corporate 
awareness  of  the  environmental  and 
societal interests of the communities in 
which  it  operates  can  also  have  an 
impact  on  the  reputation  and  the  long 
term success of a company. 
OECD  have  assembled  a  system 
of principles that are intended to assist 
member and non-member governments 
in their efforts to evaluate and improve 
the  legal,  institutional  and  regulatory 
framework for corporate governance in 
their countries, and to provide guidance 
and  suggestions  for  stock  exchanges, 
investors,  corporations,  and  other 
parties that have a role in the process of  
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developing good corporate governance. 
The principles cover five areas:  
•  the rights of shareholders;  
•  the  equitable  treatment  of 
shareholders;  
•  the role of stakeholders;  
•  disclosure and transparency;  
•  the responsibilities of the board. 
Briefly  those  principles  are  the 
following. 
The  corporate  governance 
framework should protect shareholders’ 
rights. 
The  corporate  governance 
framework should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority  and  foreign  shareholders.  All 
shareholders  should  have  the 
opportunity  to  obtain  effective  redress 
for violation of their rights. 
The  corporate  governance 
framework  should  recognize  the  rights 
of  stakeholders  as  established  by  law 
and  encourage  active  co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders 
in  creating  wealth,  jobs,  and  the 
sustainability  of  financially  sound 
enterprises. 
The  corporate  governance 
framework  should  ensure  that  timely 
and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material  matters  regarding  the 
corporation,  including  the  financial 
situation,  performance,  ownership,  and 
governance of the company. 
The  corporate  governance 
framework  should  ensure  the  strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring  of  management  by  the 
board, and the board’s accountability to 
the company and the shareholders. 
The  principles  are  primarily 
intended  to  provide  assistance  to 
governments  in  creating  a  corporate 
governance  framework.  They  can 
indeed be a useful point of reference for 
many emerging markets and economies 
in transition. Not only do the principles 
provide a benchmark for internationally 
accepted  standards,  they  also  offer  a 
solid platform for analysis and practices 
in  individual  countries  taking  into 
account country specific circumstances, 
such as legal and cultural traditions. 
 
Measuring firm performance 
Three  main  approaches  to  firm 
level  performance  are  found  in  social 
science  research:  research  based  on 
market  prices,  accounting  ratios  and 
total  factor  profitability.  Market  prices 
are readily obtained from national stock 
exchanges  for  all  listed  firms  and  are 
either  in  levels  or  first  differences. 
These data are commonly used in the 
economics  and  finance  literatures, 
whereas  Tobin’s  Q  is  frequently  the 
variable of choice in management and 
strategy research. Moreover, is it clear 
that  not  all  markets  are  efficient, 
particularly in developing and emerging 
countries  with  emerging  stock  markets 
that are known to be illiquid and lacking 
in breadth and depth.  
The  popular  Tobin’s  Q  is  a  ratio 
comprised of a continuous time variable 
in  the  numerator  and  an  annual,  or 
semi-annual, value in the denominator. 
Neither  ensures  robustness  or  stability 
in  an  estimating  equation;  however  a 
number  of  studies  relating  governance 
systems within the firm are modeled in 
this way. 
Measuring firm performance using 
accounting ratios is also common in the 
corporate  governance  literature,  in 
particular,  return  on  capital  employed, 
return  on  assets  and  return  on  equity. 
Similarly, economic value added can be 
used  as  an  alternative  to  purely 
accounting-based methods to determine 
shareholder  value  by  evaluating  the 
profitability of a firm after the total cost 
of  capital,  both  debt  and  equity,  are 
taken into account.  
 
Links between corporate 
governance and firm performance  
The  relationship  between 
corporate  governance  and  economic 
performance  incited  both  academic 
world and policymakers in recent years. 
There  is  a  special  interest  in  the 
question whether capital market based  
  128 
systems  in  the  US  and  the  UK  or  the 
blockholder  based  systems  in 
continental Europe and Japan are better 
appropriate  to  monitor  corporate 
management. The Romanian system of 
corporate governance can be seen as a 
mixture of both the capital market-based 
system and the bank based system. 
The  fundamental  question  in 
finance-based  corporate  governance 
research is whether economic value is 
driven  by  governance  mechanisms, 
such  as  the  legal  protection  of 
capitalists,  the  firm’s  competitive 
environment,  its  ownership  structure, 
board composition, and financial policy. 
Research  on  the  interaction  between 
governance and economic performance 
has  been  rather  limited,  however,  and 
the  empirical  evidence  is  mixed  and 
inconclusive.  This  is  both  because 
corporate  governance  is  a  novel 
academic field and because high-quality 
data are hard to obtain. 
Corporate  governance  systems 
can  be  distinguished  according  to  the 
degree of ownership concentration and 
the identity of controlling shareholders. 
While some systems are  characterized 
by  wide  dispersed  ownership  (outsider 
systems),  others  tend  to  be 
characterised  by  concentrated 
ownership (insider systems)  where the 
controlling  shareholder  may  be  an 
individual, family holding, bloc alliance, 
financial institution or other corporations 
acting through a holding company or via 
cross shareholdings.  
Based on a comprehensive survey 
primarily of studies from the US and UK, 
Gugler concludes that owner-controlled 
firms  tend  to  significantly  outperform 
manager-controlled  firms  [8].  For  a 
sample of listed German manufacturing 
firms,  Thonet  and  Poensgen  found 
manager-controlled firms to significantly 
outperform  owner-controlled  firms  in 
terms  of  profitability,  but  that  owner-
controlled firms had higher growth rates 
[22].  Jacquemin  and  Ghellinchk,  using 
French firm data, found no differences 
between  familial  and  non-familial 
controlled firms [12].  
Whether  or  not  owner-controlled 
firms  outperform  manager-controlled 
firms may also depend on the industry 
in question. Zeckhauser and Pound find 
that the superior performance of owner-
controlled firms holds in industries with 
relatively  low  asset  specificity  (e.g. 
machinery  and  paper  products),  but 
there  was  no  difference  in  industries 
with  high  asset  specificity  (e.g. 
computers) [23]. This suggests that the 
nature  of  the  firm’s  investment  and 
production  decisions  influence  the 
asymmetry  of  information  between 
principal and agent.  
Agency  theory  argues  that  owner 
type  matters.  Direct  principal  -  agent 
relationships  represented  by  personal 
investors  is  considered  better  than 
indirect  ownership,  where  widely  held 
private corporations or the state invest 
on others’ behalf. 
Synthetically  the  papers  mostly 
find either a positive or no link between 
outside concentration and performance. 
Morck  et  al.,  McConnell  and  Servaes, 
Belkaoui  and  Pavlik,  Holderness  et  al. 
find  a  non-monotone  relationship 
between  insider  holdings  and  firm 
performance.  Two  other  studies: 
Agrawal and Knoeber  and Cho  cannot 
detect a significant link. 
 
Conclusion 
Corporate  governance  is  a  young 
academic  field  characterized  by  partial 
theories, limited access to high–quality 
data,  inconsistent  empirics,  and 
unresolved methodological problems. 
Corporate  governance  affects  the 
development and functioning  of capital 
markets  and  exerts  a  strong  influence 
on  resource  allocation.  In  an  era  of 
increasing  capital  mobility  and 
globalization,  it  has  also  become  an 
important framework condition affecting 
the  industrial  competitiveness  and 
economies.  
Corporate  governance 
mechanisms  vary  depending  on  
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industry sectors and type of productive 
activity.  Corporate  governance 
framework  can  influence  upon  the 
development  of  equity  markets,  R&D 
and  innovative  activity,  and  the 
development  of  an  active  SME  sector, 
and  thus  influence  upon  economic 
growth. 
Identifying  what  constitutes  good 
corporate  governance  practice,  and 
under what circumstances, is a difficult 
task.  This  is  partly  because  the 
effectiveness  of  corporate  governance 
systems is influenced by differences in 
countries’  legal  and  regulatory 
frameworks,  and  historical  and  cultural 
factors,  in  addition  to  the  structure  of 
product  and  factor  markets.  The 
challenge,  therefore,  is  not  only  to 
identify  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
in  each  individual  system  or  group  of 
systems,  but  also  to  identify  what  are 
the  underlying  conditions  upon  which 
these  strengths  and  weaknesses 
depend. 
One of the main challenges facing 
policy makers is how to develop a good 
corporate governance framework which 
can secure the benefits associated with 
controlling shareholders acting as direct 
monitors,  while  at  the  same  time, 
ensuring  that  they  do  not  expropriate 
excessive rents at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  The  search  for  good 
corporate  governance  practices  should 
be  based  on  an  identification  of  what 
works in developed countries, to discern 
what  broad  principles  can  be  derived 
from these experiences, and to examine 
the conditions for transferability of these 
practices to other countries. 
Corporate  governance  is  a 
concern of great importance to owners 
of common stocks, because stockholder 
wealth depends in large part upon the 
goals of the people who set the strategy 
of  the  corporation.  However  the 
objectives of corporate managers often 
conflict  with  those  of  the  shareholders 
who own their companies.  
Mechanisms  for  controlling  the 
dimension  of  corporate  costs  are 
necessary  and  they  include  external 
and internal disciplining devices. It was 
observed  that  due  to  important 
theoretical  and  practical  limitations, 
external  disciplining  devices  including 
takeover  threat,  the  managerial  labor 
market,  and  mutual  monitoring  by 
managers,  reputation,  competition  in 
product  factor  markets  and  financial 
analysts  cannot  alone  solve  the 
corporate  governance  problem, 
although they may be important in some 
particular  circumstances.  Firms 
therefore have to adopt complementary 
internal  disciplining  devices in order to 
minimize their total agency costs. These 
internal devices include the composition 
of  the  board  of  directors,  insider 
ownership,  large  shareholders, 
compensation  packages  and  financial 
policies (dividends and debt). 
Events of the last decade indicate 
that  corporate  internal  control  systems 
have  failed  to  deal  effectively  with  the 
globalization  and  informational  era. 
Making  the  internal  control  systems  of 
corporations  work  is  the  major 
challenge of our time.  
This  paper  tries  to  improve  the 
empirical  insight  into  the  relationship 
between governance and performance. 
In  the  wake  of  a  literature  survey,  we 
discover  that  corporate  governance 
matters  for  economic  performance, 
insider  ownership  matters  the  most, 
outside  ownership  concentration 
destroys market value, direct ownership 
being superior to indirect. 
Measuring performance by Tobin’s 
Q  and  operationalizing  it  as  market  to 
book are consistent with agency theory. 
Large  outside  owners  destroy  market 
value, inside owners create it unless the 
stakes  are  unusually  big,  direct 
ownership  is  more  beneficial  than 
indirect.  Although  other  performance 
measures generally produce more fuzzy 
relationships,  Tobin’s  Q  is  rather 
consistent with long-term book return on 
assets, but not with stock returns.  
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